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DEFENSES, CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP AND EQUITIES-A
COMPARISON OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW WITH CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE PROPOSED COMMERCIAL CODE.
By W uImIE. BaTTON*
See. 1. Introduction
This article is the fourth' in a series of articles in which the writer
compares the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with corresponding provisions of the Commercial Code, specifically, the statutory material
with respect to real and personal defenses, claims of ownership and, also,
the law with respect to a number of situations which arise out of defenses
or claims of ownership and which, in a sense, are collateral thereto.
Sec. 2. Real and Personal Defenses and Claims of Ownership
in General
In many respects, under the N.I.L., the treatment of defenses and
claims of ownership, as regards rights of holders in due course and rights
of holders not in due course-the very heart of the subject-is poorly done.
Ample opportunity, therefore, is afforded to the Code to improve the statutory base.
The purpose of this section of this article is to note the sweep of the
statutory law of the N.I.L. which deals with defenses and equities and to
discuss those general sections of the N.I.L. which are involved in situations
not covered by specific provisions.
On this general level the framers of the N.I.L. chose, as key concepts,
the expressions: (1) "infirmity in the instriament" and (2) "defect in title,"
to stand, roughly, for the ideas of "defenses" and "claims of ownership."
That these concepts, of "infirmities in the instrument" and "defects in title,"
phrased in figurative language, calling to mind infirmities in the human body
and defective meat, vegetables or fruit, have not done more harm in the
law than they have is due to the ingenuity of the courts, exercised in a
spirit of tolerance and benevolence for those who draft statutes-a sine
qua non for the success of any legal system which relies, and must rely,
*Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. Professor of Law
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heavily upon statutory bases. The terms referred to appear in N.I.L. See.
52(4) where it is provided, among other things, that:
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under
the following conditions: . . . That at the time it was negotiated to him he
had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it.
N.I.L. Sec. 54 deals with the idea of notice of "any infirmity in the
instrument" and "defect in title," but does not define the terms themselves.
Sec. 56, also, has something to say about notice of an "infirmity in the
instrument" and of "defect in title."
N.I.L. Sec. 55 does undertake to define the expression "defective title."
It reads:
The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within
the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any signature
thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for
an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under
such circumstances as amount to a fraud.
This definition of defective title is really not too bad. But its framers
made no attempt to define the other expression: "infirmity in the instrument."
Then, in N.I.L. Sec. 57 appears the declaration that "A holder in due
course holds the instrument free from any defects of title of prior parties,
and free from defences available to prior parties among themselves . . ."no reference to "infirmities in the instrument," but bringing in, for the
first time, the term: "defences." The statutory ground work is, thus, of a
loose and general character.
For these expressions: "infirmity in the instrument" and "defect in
title" the Code uses, in Secs. 304 and 305, the terms "claim" and "defense."
These are far superior to the figurative expressions contained in the N.I.L.
Moreover, the terms: "claim" and "defense" were wisely left undefined.
Their meanings are to be found in common law and equity decisions.
Definitions, often desirable, when carefully drafted, sometimes put courts
in strait-jackets.
It would seem to serve no useful purpose to review any considerable
number of cases under the N.I.L. which deal with various kinds of personal
defenses with a view to determine whether decisions would be the same
under the Code. The main thing the Code has done, on this general level,
is to substitute for the expressions "infirmity in the instrument" and "defect
in title," the time-honored and highly respectable terms: "claim" and
"defense." Results under the two sets of concepts should be the same but
the terminology of the Code is better.
Real defenses will be treated with some detail for if the survey lines
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are drawn about the real defenses, the personal defenses, lying outside the
field, can be dealt with in general terms.
Sec. 3. Real and Personal Defenses, in General
At common law, and under the N.I.L., defenses are of two kinds: those
which are available as against holders in due course and those which are not
available as against holders in due course. The term "real defense" is here
used to refer to the former and the term "personal defense" is used to refer
to the latter.
-- To enumerate the categories of real defenses, they are: (1) forgery;
(2) execution without authority; (3) a species of fraud, sometimes referred
to as fraud in the execution or in the inception-akin to forgery; (4) some
kinds of duress; (5) material alteration; (6) non-delivery of an incomplete
instrument; (7) incapacity, and (8) certain kinds of illegality based upon
the specific language of statutes.
The so-called real defenses numbered from (1) to (6) are, in a sense,
not true defenses though the use of this term is convenient. Rather, they
are words used to describe various sets of facts which constitute fatal weaknesses in the plaintiff's case. They are all alike in the sense that each of
them discloses an absence of reality of consent to be bound. Even in the
fraud in the execution case the signer does not know enough about the transaction to constitute consent to be bound. In the language of the N.I.L. he has
not "engaged" to pay or to order to pay. In the serious duress case the signer
knows enough about the transaction to bind himself but he is freed from
the consequences of such knowledge because no real volition accompanies
his signing.
Real defenses (7) and (8) are defenses solely because of rules of
public policy. Within certain limits the common law erected shields from
contractual liability around those under incapacity, such as minors, insane
persons and married women. A statute may denounce certain kinds of
contracts, such as gambling contracts, in such strong language that the
purported contract is void even in the hands of a holder in due course.
All of these real defenses will be discussed in separate sections of this
article.
Every other set of facts that, under some common law, equity or statutory, rule may be asserted defensively is a personal defense and accordingly
not available against a holder in due course.
The N.I.L. Sec. 52(4) employs the term "infirmity in the instrument"
and, in Sec. 57, the term "defense" to describe what are here called "personal
defenses." Sec. 305 of the Code employs only the simple, but sweeping
term "defenses," and thus, just as does the N.I.L., leaves to the law gen-
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erally, outside the special rules of the law of negotiable instruments, the
problem of settling what facts do and do not constitute defenses.
Sec. 305 of the Code reads as follows:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the
instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract;
and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument.
All of the foregoing defenses, with particular reference to the real
defenses, are the subject of separate sections of this article, following, with
the exception of the defenses based on discharge, Code Sec. 305(2) (d)
and (e), which will be discussed in a later article in this series which will
deal with the subject of discharge.

Sec. 4.

Forgery and Unauthorized Signatures

N.I.L. See. 23. When a signature is
forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to
be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right
to retain the instrument or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment
thereof against any party thereto, can be
acquired through or under such signature,
unless the party, against whom it is sought
to enforce such right, is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority.

Code See. 3-404(1). Any unauthorized
signature is wholly inoperative as that of
the person whose name is signed unless he
ratifies it or is precluded from denying it;
but it operates as the signature of the
unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument
or takes it for value.
(2) Any unauthorized signature may
be ratified for all purposes of this Article.
Such ratification does not of itself affect
any rights of the person ratifying against
the actual signer.

Neither the N.I.L. nor the Code defines "forgery," hence, under the
law, and under the Code, the fact situations which constitute forgery are
ascertainable from judicial decisions. The Code, therefore, makes no change
in the concept "forgery" for under each provision its meaning is derived
from the same data.
The over-all operative effect of N.I.L. Sec. 23 is found in the declaration
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that the "forgery" is "wholly inoperative." The concept "inoperativeness"
is then broken down and possibly extended into three detailed illustrations
of "inoperativeness," i.e., that subsequent to forgery there exists: (1) "no
right to retain the instrument," and (2) "no right to give a discharge
therefor," and (3) "no right to enforce payment thereof against any party
thereto." The declaration that there is "no right" to do any of these three
things, is further amplified by the clause "can be acquired through or under
such signature."
Specifically, the provision, declaring that there is "no right to enforce
payment thereof" has meant that a forged signature of a maker of a note,
of the acceptor of a bill, of the drawer of a bill and of the indorser of a
note or bill, cannot be held liable on the instrument by any holder, whether
in due course or not in due course, or by any transferee of such instrument.
This aspect of the legal effect of forgery is commonly expressed by the
generalization that "forgery is a real defense." Results would be identical
under the Code.
What does N.I.L. Sec. 23 mean by declaring that "no right to . . .
give a discharge therefor . . . can be acquired through or under such
signature"? This question seems not to have been discussed. The term
"discharge" includes, payment, accord and satisfaction, material alteration,
cancellation, renunciation and acquisition at, or after, maturity in an
obligor's own right. Sec. 23 seems to say that any act of purported discharge
of an instrument, bearing such person's forged or unauthorized signature,
is inoperative. It would be the apparent obligor who normally could discharge by payment, and by reacquiring in his own right. It would be the
holder who would discharge by renunciation, cancellation, or by material
alteration. The latter, of course, could be done by a stranger.
In so far as the purported signer's act of attempted discharge by
payment or by accord and satisfaction, is concerned, N.I.L. Sec. 23 appears
to say that his act is inoperative, i.e., no discharge and no ratification could
flow therefrom. If this is so it constitutes a line of thought which could be
used adversely to the decisions which hold that a forgery can be ratified.
In so far as this provision concerns payments by a purported principal of
an instrument bearing his unauthorized signature, it would appear to declare
that the payment is inoperative. There may, of course, be "payments" which
do not constitute ratification because of want of knowledge by the payor,
but certainly there may be payments which do constitute ratifications in the
law of agency. It is almost inconceivable that such a payment would not
constitute a discharge despite the language of See. 23, except as against
the forger or unauthorized agent. The law of agency should override
contrary implications.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 7

As regards discharges by cancellation, renunciation, and material alteration, acts which would be done by holders, there is no apparent reason why
these acts of discharge should not operate as they normally do. No cases
have been found on the point. It is reasonably predictable that a court
would not accept the statement that there is no such thing as a discharge
of a forged or unauthorized signature but would find some way out, if justice
called for it.
What does the provision, in N.I.L. Sec. 23, stating that "no right to
retain the instrument . . . can be acquired through or under such signature. . . ." mean? It would seem to mean that the party whose signature
was forged or affixed without authority had a right to get it back. But, should
he have such right in all cases? Suppose it is the signature of a maker
that is involved. The note has gone through the hands of several indorsers.
Should not the holder have the right to retain the instrument for the purpose
of suit against prior indorsers, either on their indorsements or on the warranty
theory? It would seem so. In other words, there will be cases where it
would be proper for a court to allow a person, whose signature was forged
or unauthorizedly affixed, to get it back but there surely would be cases
where such party is amply protected by the facts used by him as a shield
of defense against asserted liability, but where, if he were allowed to get
the instrument back, it would work a hardship on the holder. A court could
well work its way out of such apparent dilemma. Again, the point is, that
the Code by not incorporating the detailed provision that there is "no right
to retain such instrument" has removed the difficulty above noted.
One reason for going into the questions of the possible, curious effects
of parts of the provision, contained in N.I.L. Sec. 23, which declares that
where a signature has been forged that there is "no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto. .. ." is to note that the Code properly omits the quoted
clause entirely and rests solely on the declaration that the forged signature
is "wholly inoperative."
The provision contained in N.I.L. Sec. 23 and Code Sec. 404, that
forged or unauthorized signatures are "wholly inoperative," being identical
would produce identical results.
With respect to facts which will override the rule of non-liability, the
N.I.L. provides: "Unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce
such right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."
The corresponding language of the Code is: "Unless he ratifies it or is
precluded from denying it." The facts which have been held to preclude
the setting up of forgery under the N.I.L. should be the same as those which
should preclude one from denying the forgery. In this respect the verb
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"setting up" should be identical in meaning with that of the verb "denying"
the forgery.
One difference in language here appears. The N.I.L. uses the word
"preclude" only. The Code expressly uses, not only the word "preclude,"
but also uses the words "ratifies it." It has been held' that the word
"preclude," as used in N.I.L. Sec. 23, includes the idea of ratification as
well as that of estoppel. There are too few cases to warrant the conclusion
that all courts, in jurisdictions where forgeries are capable of ratification,
would hold that "ratification" is included in the term "preclude." The Code
proceeds upon the assumption either that "ratification" is not included in
the term "preclude" or that there is such doubt about it that it should be
made express. This would seem to be a wise precaution. Hence, under the
Code, the desirable result reached in Strader v. Haley' would be assured.
In jurisdictions where a forgery is incapable of ratification, 4 of course,
the rule of the above case would not obtain. But Sec. 3-404(2) of the Code
would change such rule for this provision reads: "Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this Article." This provision would
also restate the agency rule under which a principal may ratify his signature
where a person signed it purporting to act for and to have authority to bind
such purported principal. The Code provision would not affect a rule in
the law of agency, outside the law of negotiable instruments, not dealt with
by Article 3 of the Code, under which forgeries may be incapable of ratification. Such rules would remain unchanged. And, of course, the new
provision of the Code would have no necessary effect on the criminal law.
The last clause of Sec. 3-404(1) is new. It provides that the unauthor.
ized signature ". . . operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in
favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value." The only person who could "pay it" would be the person whose
name was unauthorizedly signed. Any person could "take it for value,"
that is, purchase it. That would mean that the payor, although his act of
payment may or may not have constituted a ratification as regards the third
party, promisee, the payor would have such rights against the actual signer
as the law otherwise would give the payor against such person, if such person
had signed his own name. And the same would be true as regards the rights
of a purchaser for value in good faith. This provision is wise, though the
same result should be reached under the N.I.L. Sec. 18, which provides:
"One who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent
as if he had signed his own name." That is, the actual signer is bound on
the instrument whether there was or was not a ratification. To obviate the
Strader v. Haley, 216 Minn. 315, 12 N.W.2d 608 (1943).
Ibid.
'The cases are discussed in MEcHEm, OUTLnEms oF AGENCY §§ 223-25.
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possibility that ratification might be held to mean that the actual signer
was not bound on the instrument after ratification, Sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 404
provides: "Such ratification does not, of itself, affect any rights of the
person ratifying against the actual signer."
The Code's provision with respect to forgery is superior to the corresponding provision of the N.I.L.
Sec. 5. Fraud as a Real Defense
N.I.L. No corresponding provision.

Code Sec. 305-(1) (2) (c). To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course
he takes the instrument free from (1) all
claims to it on the part of any person;
and (2) all defenses of any party to the
instrument with whom the holder has not
delt except (c) such misrepresentation as
has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of
its character or its essential terms.

This section is new. Illinois and Wisconsin expressly incorporated in
their respective drafts of the N.I.L. the rule embodied in the Code Sec. 305
(1) (2) (c). The inclusion of the proposed new section is wise. The law
embodied therein is well established by common law cases in England and
America. There have been numerous cases, 5 going back generally to the
leading case of Foster v. McKinnon.'
In another place the present writer has summarized the cases in the
following language:
If a person is induced by fraud to sign a negotiable instrument under
circumstances where he does not know the nature of the instrument which
he signs but justifiably believes that he is signing a writing of entirely
different character, and where by the exercise of ordinary care he could not
have known the nature of the instrument which he is induced to sign, his
signature imposes no duty upon him to any holder, including a holder in
due course, because his signature is unaccompanied by the required contractual intent.
Where such a signer does not know the nature of the instrument which
he signs but where, by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have discovered
the nature of such instrument, his signature imposes a contractual duty upon
him which is enforceable against him by a holder in due course, a holder
not in due course being subject to the signer's defense of fraud.
If the signer is literate and under the circumstances present at the time
he signs, could read the instrument signed by him and does not do so, he
The cases are collected in BRITTON, BILLS & NOTES, § 130, at 566-86. The whole problem was
carefully reviewed in C.I.T. Corp. v. Panac, Cal. App., 149 P.2d 901 (1944); 25 Cal.2d 547,
154 P.2d 710, 160 A.L.R. 1285 (1944).
6 L.R. 4 C.P. 704 (1869).
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will be deemed negligent, his defense of fraud will be personal and not available as against a holder in due course.
If the signer is not able to read, either because of illiteracy, impaired
vision or because of other attendant circumstances, and there is present or
readily accessible no third party who could be called upon to read the instrument, the signer will not be deemed negligent and his defense will be real
and available as against all holders including holders in due course.
The question as to what facts constitute negligence is for the jury under
proper instructions.
The burden rests upon the signer to convince the trier of the facts that
he signed the instrument under circumstances which impose no liability upon

him.
A few courts, at common law, held that the defense of
non-negligent
7
execution was not available against a holder in due course.

The language of Code 305(1) (2) (c) should reproduce the result in
the cases which accept the prevailing doctrine.
Four points should be mentioned. Subsection (2) (c),

of Sec. 305,

in form, is a limitation on See. 305(2) but is not in form a limitation on
the introductory clause of Sec. 305(1). It should be a limitation on both
subsections (1) and (2). If subsection (c)-the Foster v. McKinnon doctrine-which makes a species of fraud a real defense, is not construed also

as a limitation on subsection (1) the anomaly would be presented of
declaring that, an indorser so situated, when sued could successfully defend
but he would not be able to recover his instrument from a remote holder,
for, apparently, "all claims" are cut off by subsection (1). This type of
case would be rare but it would be better drafting if it were clear that the
Foster v. McKinnon rule could be used offensively as well as defensively.
The cases have worked out the rule employing the language of negligence. The Code does not use the language of negligence but substitutes
the phrase ". . . knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge
of its character or its essential terms." While there is always a risk that
new language intended to reproduce a rule phrased in other terminology
will lead to divergent results and to unnecessary litigation, it would seem
likely that the new language of Sec. 305(2) (c) would not be interpreted
so as to produce results different from what are now produced by the use
of the terminology of negligence. Only time and litigation will tell.
Since the real defense based on fraud is analogous to forgery and to
material alteration, situations where the rules on burden of proof are not
always identical, it would have been desirable to have incorporated a rule
on the matter of burden of proof in the fraud case rather than to leave the
issue exposed to the risk of conflict of authority.
'BBRION, op. cit. supra note 5, § 130 at 556.
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Sec. 305(1) (2) deals expressly only with the rights of holders. It omits
reference to the corresponding rights of paying or accepting drawees. The
rights of such parties should have been covered.
Sec. 305(2) (c) deals only with a certain species of fraud. Certain
species of duress are strongly analogous to this kind of fraud. Duress is
covered by Code Sec. 305(2) (b). The only difference between this kind
of fraud and some kinds of duress is that the signer, in the one case is misled,
by the kind of fraud defined to sign his name to a document which he does
not understand while in the other the signer is not misled as to any fact
but signs in fear of death or other serious harm. If justifiable ignorance
creates a real defense, action, unaccompanied by any true volition should
do likewise. This seems to be the law.' Sec. 305(2) (b) makes "duress"
a real defense if the circumstances "render the obligation of a party a
nullity." Existing case law, therefore, would be available in the process of
interpretation.
Sec. 6. Non-delivery of a Completed Instrument
N.I.L. Sec. 16. Every contract on a
Code Sec. 306(c). Unless he has the
negotiable instrument is incomplete and rights of a holder in due course any
revocable until delivery of the instrument person takes the instrument subject to
for the purpose of giving effect thereto. . . . the defenses of ... non-delivery or
As between immediate parties, and as re- delivery for a special purpose.
gards a remote party other than a holder
in due course, the delivery, in order to
be effectual, must be made either by or
under the authority of the party making,
drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the
case may be; and in such case the delivery
may be shown to have been conditional,
or for a special purpose only, and not for
the purpose of transferring the property
in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due
course, a valid delivery thereof by all
parties prior to him so as to make them
liable to him is conclusively presumed.
And where the instrument is no longer in
the possession of a party whose signature
appears thereon, a valid and intentional
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
At common law, unlike the law with respect to written contracts generally, delivery of a negotiable instrument was a condition precedent to
the existence of the contract between the maker or drawer and the first
holder. This rule arose out of the conception that a negotiable instrument
' State v. Wegener, 180 Iowa 102, 162 N.W. 1040 (1917) ; Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153,
13 N.E. 596 (1887).

Nov., 19551

DEFENSES, CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP AND EQUITIES

was a species of property. Hence, the theft of the completed instrument
by the payee, or first holder of a bearer instrument, gave rise to a defense
which was available against a subsequent holder in due course.' A few
cases treated the defense of non-delivery of a completed instrument as a
personal defense not available against a holder in due course.' 0
Sec. 16 of the N.I.L., by its provision that: "Where the instrument is
in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties
prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed"
makes non-delivery of a completed instrument a personal defense although
the instrument escaped from the maker or drawer without his negligent
custody of the instrument after execution.
Non-delivery of a completed instrument by this issuer remains a
personal defense under Sec. 306(c) of the Code. There is this difference
in the matter of the burden of proof. Under N.I.L. Sec. 16, the last sentence,
there is a presumption of delivery, whereas under the Code the non-delivery
of an instrument is referred to as a defense, there being no preservation
of the presumption of delivery, nor does the Code preserve the affirmative
requirement of delivery set forth in Sec. 16 of the N.I.L. Deliveries upon
conditions precedent and deliveries for a special purpose probably reproduce
the results in the cases decided under N.I.L. See. 16." Deliveries on conditions subsequent are not provable under N.I.L. Sec. 16." Nothing is
said affirmatively, in Sec. 306 of the Code, about conditions subsequent but
the express reference in Sec. 306 to conditions precedent only should preserve
the case law concerning the effect of the parol evidence rule on the nonprovability of conditions subsequent.
Sec. 7. Non-delivery of Incomplete Instruments
N.I.L. See. 15. Where an incomplete
Code See. 115(1). When a paper
instrument has not been delivered it will whose contents at the time of signing show
not, if completed and negotiated, without that it is intended to become an instruauthority, be valid contract in the hands ment is signed while still incomplete in
of any holder, as against any person any necessary respect it cannot be enwhose signature was placed thereon be- forced until completed, but when it is
fore delivery,
completed in accordance with authority
given it is effective as completed. (2) If
the completion is unauthorized the rules
as to material alteration apply (Section
3-407), even though the paper was not
delivered by the maker or drawer; but
the burden of establishing that any completion is unauthorized is on the party
so asserting.
"Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415 (1870).
10 Shipley v. Carroll, 45 IML 285 (1867) ; Kinyon v. Wohlford, 17 Minn. 239 (1871).
"The cases are collected in BRrrroN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 54.
2BRTToN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 55.
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At common law the non-delivery of an incomplete instrument was a
real defense, and available as against a holder in due course, just as was
the non-delivery of a completed instrument. 3 The N.I.L. in Sec. 15,
preserved the common law rule by its declaration that a non-delivered
incomplete instrument would not be a valid contract "in the hands of any
holder." Thus, under the N.I.L., the law with respect to non-delivered
completed instruments is directly contrary to that with respect to incomplete
instruments. Some courts, however, have held that the facts existing at
the time of the escape of the instrument from the possession of the maker
or drawer may be such as to estop the maker or drawer from setting up
the defense of non-delivery of the incomplete instrument as against the
drawee bank.14 But the estoppel is generally held not to run against the
maker or drawer in favor of a holder in due course.15 The superior position
of a drawee bank over that of a holder in due course is said to arise from
the antecedent contractual relations between the depositor and his bank
which imposes a risk upon the bank either in deciding to honor or not to
honor whereas a holder acts entirely at his own election.
Sec. 115(2) of the Code reverses the rule of N.I.L. Sec. 15 and makes
non-delivery of an incomplete instrument a personal defense. This change
is wise. The difference between a completed instrument and an incomplete
instrument is not enough to justify diametrically opposite results as is true
under the N.I.L. Also, it is difficult to justify, practically, an estoppel against
the setting up of the defense of non-delivery as regards a drawee bank
and not as against a holder in due course. These possible anomalies disappear under the Code.
The provision contained in Sec. 115(1), forbidding actions on incomplete instruments "until completed" is too sweeping in character. For
example, there is no valid reason for refusing to permit an action by a
holder of an instrument, complete in all aspects, except that it is blank as
to the payee's name. A holder under a blank indorsement is not now
required to fill it in. The holder of an instrument blank as to the payee's
name should be able to sue upon it as a bearer instrument.
3 Baxendale v. Bennett, 3 Q.B.D. 525 (1878).
" In the following cases the drawee bank was allowed to debit the drawer's account: S. S. Allen
Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan Co., 192 Mo. App. 476, 182 S.W. 777 (1916); Trust Co. of
America v. Conklin, 65 Misc. 1, 119 N.Y.S. 367 (1909) ; Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance
on Lives and Granting Annuities, 160 Pa. Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947). But the estoppel can
he destroyed by negligence of the drawee. Hays v. Lowndes Say. Bank & Trust Co., 118 W. Va. 360,
190 S.E. 543 (1937).
" Linick v. A. J. Nutting & Co., 140 App.Div. 265, 125 N.Y.S. 93 (1910) ; Venable v. American
Express Co., 217 N.C. 548, 8 S.E.2d 804 (1940) ; Pavilis v. Farmers Union Livestock Comm.,
68 S.D. 96, 298 N.W. 732 (1941) ; City Nat. Bank of Galveston v. American Express Co., Tex. Civ.
App., 16 S.W.2d 278 (1929). But a holder in due course was allowed to recover in American
Express Co. v. Anadarka Bank & Trust Co., 179 Okl. 606, 67 P.2d 55 (1937).
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Sec. 8. Material Alteration
N.I.L. Sec. 124. Where a negotiable
instrument is materially altered without
the assent of all parties liable thereon, it
is avoided, except as against a party who
has himself made, authorized or assented
to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers.
But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a
holder in due course, not a party to the
alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor.
N.I.L. Sec. 125. Any alteration which
changes (1) The date, (2) The sum payable, either for principal or interest;
(3) The time or place of payment;
(4) The number or the relations of the
parties; (5) The medium or currency in
which payment is to be made; or which
adds a place of payment where no place
of payment is specified, or any other
change or addition which alters the effect
of the instrument in any respect, is a
material alteration.

Code See. 407(1). Any alteration of
an instrument is material which changes
the contract of any party thereto in any
respect, including any such change in
(a) the number or relations of the
parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to
it or by removing any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than
a subsequent holder in due course
(a) alteration by the holder which is
both fraudulent and material discharges any party whose contract
is thereby changed unless that
party assents or is precluded from
asserting the defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any
party and the instrument may be
enforced according to its original
tenor, or as to incomplete instruments according to the authority
given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course
may in all cases enforce the instrument
according to its original tenor, and when
an incomplete instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed.
Code Sec. 601(1) (f). The extent of
the discharge of any party from liability
on an instrument is governed by the sections

on ..

. fraudulent

and material

alteration. Sec. 407.

1. What are the facts which will constitute a material alteration?
N.I.L. Sec. 125 declares that "any alteration" which changes the date,
the sum, the time of payment, the place of payment, including the addition
of a place of payment, the number of parties, the relation of parties, the
medium of payment, is a material alteration. Then Sec. 125 goes beyond
these particularizations and adds a comprehensive statement, in general
terms, by providing that "any other change or addition which alters the
effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration."
Has Sec. 407 of the Code added to or subtracted from the concept of
material alteration as set forth in N.I.L. Sec. 125? The Code expressly
includes Sec. 125(4) of the N.I.L., i.e., the clause: "the number or the
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relation of the parties." No change here. The Code does not expressly
refer to alterations of the date, the sum, the time or place of payment, the
medium of payment, or the addition of a place of payment, as material.
Are they made so by any general language of Sec. 407? It is believed that
all of the enumerations contained in N.I.L. Sec. 125 would be derived from
the general language contained in Code Sec. 407 which provides: "Any
alteration is material which changes the contract of any party thereto in
any respect," because all of the enumerations of N.I.L. Sec. 125 describe
sets of facts which do "change the contract" of one or more parties to the
instrument. Without the express inclusion in Code Sec. 407, of Sec. 125(4)
it might have been possible to hold that any addition of names or any change
in relationship of parties might constitute a material alteration even if no
change in the contract of any party was thereby effected.
How does the general language, defining a material alteration in
N.I.L. Sec. 125, compare with the general language defining a material
alteration in Code Sec. 407? Sec. 125 of the N.I.L. throws the emphasis
upon alterations of "the effect of the instrument in any respect." Sec. 407
of the Code throws the emphasis upon alterations "which changes the
contract of any party thereto in any respect." The question comes down to
this: do any and all sets of facts which alter "the effect of the instrument
in any respect," also constitute "changes in the contract of any party thereto
in any respect." The answer is, in part, speculative. Every "change in
the contract" would certainly "alter the effect of the instrument." Would
every alteration of the "effect of the instrument in any respect" also constitute a "change in the contract" of some party thereto? Probably, though
it is possible to think that the language of Sec. 125, in this respect, may
be microscopically broader than that contained in Sec. 407 of the Code.
In any event it seems preferable, for clarity sake, to harness the general
definition of material alterations to the idea of "changes in the contract"
than to the somewhat looser term "alteration of the effect of the instrument."
The Code proposes that unauthorized completions of instruments issued
in incomplete form shall constitute material alterations. This topic is
discussed in the section of this article which immediately follows here. The
matter is mentioned here because the unauthorized completion of an incomplete instrument, issued or not issued, but which escapes from the maker or
drawer, constitutes sets of facts which fall within the concept of material
alterations.
Turning now to the comparison of the legal effects of material alterations under the N.I.L. and Code, what are the specific questions which may
be raised? N.I.L. Sec. 124 declares that "where a negotiable instrument is
materially altered, it is avoided. . . ." This language appears in a section
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entitled: "Discharge of Negotiable Instruments." Hence the verb "avoided"
is used in the sense of "discharge." The Code does not use the verb
"avoided" but does use the term "discharge" in both subsections (a) and
(b) of Sec. 407(2). Hence, thus far, there should be identity of meaning.
The next question is: do all material alterations under the N.I.L. result
in discharge or only some of them, and, similarly, do all material alterations
under the Code result in discharge or only some of them. Are the inclusions
and exclusions under the N.I.L. and Code identical or different? Specifically,
fraudulent material alterations and innocent material alterations must be
considered; also material alterations both fraudulent and innocent by
holders, by transferees who are not holders and by strangers, i.e., nonowners and non-holders. And finally, as against what parties does a discharge operate as such?
The N.I.L. Sec. 124 makes no distinctions between material alterations
which were innocently affected and those which were fraudulently made.
The instrument is avoided in each instance. Sec. 407 of the Code draws
a distinction between the legal effect of fraudulent material alterations
and innocent material alterations. An instrument which is fraudulently and
materially altered is discharged, for the section reads: ". . . alteration

by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any party
whose contract is thereby changed .
..." Sec. 407 continues and provides:
"no other alteration discharges any party. . . ... The Code thus restores

a common law rule adopted by some courts.1" The change is wise for the
holder of an instrument which he or some one innocently altered, although
not a holder in due course, should be able to sue upon the negotiable instrument and not be forced to lose the advantages thereon and be required to
sue on the underlying debt.
See. 124 of the N.I.L. speaks of discharging "the instrument" while
Sec. 407 of the Code speaks of discharging "any party whose contract is
thereby changed." There may be some room for variation in result but it
would seem to be largely theoretical rather than practical.
Who are the parties under the N.I.L. and the Code whose acts of
materially altering instruments will have the effect of discharge? Under
the N.I.L. there is no limitation for Sec. 124 merely says: "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered . . ." apparently meaning by any-

body. This language includes owning and non-owning holders and trans.
ferees of unindorsed paper payable to the order of the transferor, strangers
in possession, rightly or wrongly. The Code speaks only of alterations "by
the holder." This is not good, for instruments altered by transferees of
unindorsed paper, who are not holders under N.I.L. Sec. 191 nor under Sec.
x' See Williston, Dischargeof Contracts by Alteration, 18 HARv. L. REv. 105, 115 (1904).
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1-201(20), should have the same effect as alterations by holders. This
may have been a "slip of the pen" which the courts would patch up, but
some courts elect to "hew to the literal line and let the chips fall where they
may." The language of the Code is too restrictive. More debatable, perhaps,
is the matter of material alterations by strangers, at common law sometimes
called "spoilation." Under N.I.L. Sec. 124, it would seem "spoilation" is
included in Sec. 124. At common law in England, "spoilation" avoided the
instrument.' 7 This rule was codified in the English Bills of Exchange Act."8
At common law in the United States, alteration by a stranger, i.e.,
agent of the obligor, or obligee acting without authority, or a thief, finder
or other wrongful possessor, did not avoid the instrument. 9 By adopting
the language of the English Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. :124 of the N.I.L.
would seem to have adopted the English rule. But in the few cases which
have arisen under Sec. 124, involving the doctrine of "spoilation," the
courts have continued to apply the American common law rule, usually with
little if any consideration of the effect of the language of Sec. 124.20 The
Code is defective in not having cleared up this problem.
Against what persons does the discharge from material alteration
operate? Sec. 124 of the N.I.L. provides that a materially altered instrument "is avoided except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers." N.I.L. Sec.
124 continues by declaring that: "When a materially altered instrument is
in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he
may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."
The corresponding language of Sec. 407 of the Code is: "As against
any person other than a subsequent holder in due course alteration by the
holder, which is both fraudulent and material, discharges any party whose
contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from
asserting the defense. . . . A subsequent holder in due course may in all
cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor ....
To compare these provisions. Under Sec. 124 of the N.I.L., the instrument is declared not discharged as against the one who altered the instrument, nor discharged as against one who authorized the alteration or who
"assented" to, i.e., ratified the alteration. Sec. 407 of the Code also uses
the term "assents," so these identical terms would produce the same results.
It would have been better to have used the term "ratifies" as the Code does
in the forgery Sec. 404(1). The Code expression, "or is precluded from
asserting the defense," would include the party who "authorized" the
Davidson v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 343 (1844).
§ 64 (1).
19 Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N.Y. 573 (1874).
20 Jeffrey v. Rosenfeld, 179 Mass. 506, 61 N.E. 49 (1901).
"
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alteration but is broader than the N.I.L. term. The Code's phrasing is better
because of its breadth and because it employs the same expression as is
used in Sec. 404(1) dealing with forgery.
It is difficult to see what purpose is served by the statement, of N.I.L.
See. 124, that a material alteration is not avoided as against "subsequent
indorsers," for N.I.L. Secs. 65 and 66 provide that qualified and unqualified
indorsers warrant, "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what
it purports to be." This statement includes a warranty against material
alteration as well as against forgeries.2 1 The Code, properly, omits references, in this section, to the liability of indorsers of materially altered
instruments.
At common law, when a negotiable instrument was discharged by
material alteration the discharge operated against holders in due course as
well as holders not in due course.2 2 This rule was changed by the N.I.L.
by permitting a holder in due course to recover upon the materially altered
instrument "according to its original tenor." See. 407 of the Code retains
this rule by the employment of the same language.
What changes in the law are effected by the Code's declaration, in See.
115, "If the completion [of an incomplete instrument] is unauthorized
the rules as to material alterations apply"? This statement of policy is
carried out by Sec. 407 of the Code which provides: "Any alteration of
an instrument which changes the contract of any party thereto in any respect,
including any such change in (b) an incomplete instrument, by completing
it otherwise than as authorized."
Under Secs. 14 and 15 of the N.I.L. dealing with incomplete instruments, the legal effects of unauthorized completion are set forth in these
sections but they are not denominated "material alterations." What changes
in the law are thus proposed?
Case (1), an instrument, blank as to amount, issued by the maker or
drawer to the payee with authority to fill it up for $100.00. The payee
fraudulently fills it up for $200.00. Under the N.I.L. an innocent drawee
could debit $200.00 and a subsequent holder in due course could recover
$200.00. The same result would follow if the filling up of the instrument
were unauthorized but innocently filled up. The same result should follow
under Sec. 407 of the Code for subsection 3 provides: "A subsequent holder
in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument according to its
original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has been completed,
he may enforce it as completed." The results under the N.I.L. and the Code
"1 Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488 (1814); Birmingham Nat. Bank v. Bradley, 103 Ala. 109,
15 So. 440 (1893).
" Mastors v. Miller, 4 T.R. 320 (1791) ; Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Chisholm, 169 Pa. 564, 32 AtL
730 (1895).
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are thus identical. Both the N.I.L. and the Code are defective in not having
expressly declared the rights of an innocent drawee.
Case (2). Same facts as in Case (1) except that the holder in possession
is not a holder in due course. Under N.I.L. See. 14 the non-holder-in-duecourse may enforce the instrument, only if it is "filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time." Under Sec.
407(2) (b) the non-holder-in-due-course of an instrument which was issued
or escaped when incomplete, and completed in excess of authority may
enforce it only "according to the authority given." The omission from the
Code of the term "strictly," probably would be inconsequential. The limitation, contained in the N.I.L. See. 14, restricting the right of one who is not
a holder in due course to recover upon the instrument in accordance with
the authority given to acts of completion done "within a reasonable time,"
is not continued in the Code. This omission also would seem to be of little
consequence.
So it appears that the Code's proposal to call "unauthorized completions
of incomplete instruments" "material alterations" is a change in terminology
only, a policy which is usually not commendable for it tends to confusion.
Sec. 9. Material Alteration Resulting from Negligent Execution
N.I.L. No corresponding Section.
Code Sec. 406. Any person who by his
negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration of the instrument or to
the making of an unauthorized signature
is precluded from asserting the alteration
or lack of authority against a holder in
due course or against a drawee or other
payor who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's
or payor's business.
The rule, stated above, embodies the doctrine of Young v. Grote.2 3
In another connection the present writer stated the rule, deduced from the
cases, in the following language.
In most jurisdictions a party to a negotiable instrument, issued by the
maker or drawer complete in form, which is subsequently materially altered
by the insertion of words and figures in spaces therein negligently left by the
maker or drawer, is estopped as against a good faith drawee to set up such
material alteration.
In a few jurisdictions there is a similar estoppel as against a holder in
due course,
the majority of cases holding that there is no estoppel in such
24
case.

" 4 Bing. 253 (1827).
" The cases are collected in BRITTON, op. cit. supranote 5, § 282.
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Will Sec. 406 of the Code reproduce the case law? In one respect there
is an intentional change in the law in those jurisdictions which now hold that
there is no estoppel against a holder in due course in such case. The section
adopts the rule, in a minority of jurisdictions, which erect the estoppel
equally as against a holder in due course and as against a drawee. It is
believed that this policy of removing the conflict of authority is wise.
Does the inclusion of the words "an unauthorized signature" extend
the rule beyond existing cases? The answer is uncertain. In one cas25
the court suggested that where a depositor had a rubber stamp of his signature
and it is used by a third party to affix the depositor's name to a check without
his authority, the drawee bank would have the right to debit the depositor's
account, if the depositor had been negligent in his custody of the rubber
stamp. It is believed that the policy of extending the estoppel to unauthorized
signatures-if this is an extension-is desirable. What situations of fact
would be covered, in addition to the rubber stamp signature case, would
be difficult to predict. It is believed that the added language would not
expand or otherwise affect the case law on agency by estoppel. Probably
the added language would include the theft of engraving plates containing
signatures if the theft had been facilitated by negligent custody.
Would the words "substantially contributes to a material alteration"
expand, contract or leave unchanged existing case law? The answer would
be conjectural. It would depend, in part, upon the respective views of courts
as to the meaning of these words. In any event the foundation for a new
argument designed to stretch or contract the present law is laid.
Sec. 406 confines the estoppel as against holders in due course and
drawees who "pay" the instrument. The status of a certifying bank or
acceptor of a bill is left "up in the air." It should have been expressly
provided for. Moreover, the gap thus left could get the problem of estoppel
or not, as against a certifying bank of checks negligently executed, tangled
up with the problem of the status of a drawee bank which certifies a check
altered by erasures and substitutions."6
Sec. 406 erects the estoppel in favor of payors "in good faith and in
accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or

payor's business." (Emphasis added.) The injection of the additional
requirement of payment "in accordance with the reasonable commercial
standards of the drawee's or payor's business," is highly objectionable for
the reasons which the present writer has set forth elsewhere.2"
23

Robb v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, 186 Pa. St. 456, 40 At.

970 (1898).
" Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931).
27 Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparisonof the Provisionsof the Negotiable Instruments

Law with those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 430 (1954).
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Sec. 406 may project one question more vividly than it appeared at
common law, and that is this. At common law the erection of the estoppel
occurred only with respect to that kind of negligent execution which permitted
material alteration by the insertion of words and figures in blank spaces on
a completed instrument which were deemed negligently left by the maker
or drawer. The estoppel was not carried so far as to enable one to claim
that it was negligence to draw an instrument with lead pencil or washable
ink. This may have been illogical but the courts, having had difficulty in
justifying the rule in the first place, simply confined it in a strait-jacket:
"Thus far we go and no farther."
Under Sec. 406 the doctrine is dignified by statutory language with
nothing contained therein suggesting its confinement to common law fact
situations. If the courts interpret the term "negligence" as used in Sec. 406,
historically, that is, finding the meaning of the term solely in common law
cases and cases under the N.I.L., then there would be no predictable extension of the rule to the lead pencil, washable ink and similar cases. But courts
do not always interpret statutory language as they used it in opinions at
common law, and wisely so oftentimes. No one can predict what would
happen, along this line, under Sec. 406. It would have been preferable to
have confined Sec. 406 expressly to the fact situations which had been recognized by the courts at common law rather than to have used the term "negligence" without limitation. If this change should lead to the requirement
that "the man in the street" must be as careful as a bank usually is, the
expansion of the law would be highly undesirable.
Sec. 10. Comparisonof DraftingPolicieswith Respect to Analogous
Problems
The "Fraud in the Execution" cases and the "Negligent Execution"
cases are strikingly analogous. Yet the drafting policies disclosed are dissimilar. Sec. 305(1) (2) (c), which deals with the fraud case, makes no
provision for the paying, accepting or certifying drawee. Only holders in
due course acquire rights under the section. Under Sec. 406, which deals
with the Negligent Execution case, the section erects the estoppel in favor of
holders in due course and paying drawees but says nothing about the position
of an accepting or certifying drawee. This is not good.
Again, both rules were worked out at common law by the use of the
terminology of negligence. Sec. 406 retains the language of negligence
but Sec. 305 rejects it and substitutes the language of "knowledge" and
"the reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge." Was this variation intentional or accidental? It will require litigation to find out. Analogous problems, at common law, which have been worked over by the courts with
identical terminology, when cast into statutory form should retain the use
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of the same terminology unless there is a highly persuasive reason for
variation. There seems to be none here.

Sec. 11. Claims of Ownership Specifically Considered
There are, perhaps, four situations where claims of ownership become
involved: (1) where there is no defense between the original parties and
some remote party acquires possession or title under circumstances which
gives rise to a right of restitution in a prior party and such prior party
seeks to recover the instrument or its proceeds in a direct attack upon the
party in possession or who holds the legal title; (2) where the facts are
the same as in Case (1) but where the party in possession or who holds the
legal title sues an obligor who has no defense of his own and where the
party who has the right of restitution from the plaintiff is not a party to
the litigation and the defendant attempts to set up in defense the right of
restitution in such third party; (3) where there is an outstanding claim of
ownership, or right of restitution, in a third party and where the defendant,
prior party, possesses also a personal defense of his own and where the
plaintiff, holder, has knowledge of the facts which create the right of restitution but does not have knowledge of defendant's own personal defense,
and the question is whether the plaintiff, who, admittedly, is not a holder in
due course as regards the outstanding claim thereby is rendered a non-due
course holder as regards the unknown defense of the defendant; and (4)
where there is an outstanding claim of ownership in a third party and such
party seeks to recover the instrument, or its proceeds, in a direct attack
against an innocent purchaser who is not a holder in due course because his
purchase took place after maturity.
In all of these four cases the outstanding claim of ownership, or right
to restitution, is not referred to expressly in the N.J.L. but is an appropriate
term to describe what a former holder has as a result of a subsequent party's
acquisition of what the N.I.L. calls "a defect in title." The Code, in Secs.
304 and 305, uses the simple term "claim" instead of the term "defect in
title." The new terminology is preferable for it throws the emphasis upon
the outstanding legal or equitable right rather than upon the wrong which
creates the duty to return the instrument. The whole body of law outside
the Code is thus thrown open for use in determining whether the "claim"
is well founded or not.
To comment specifically upon each of the four cases referred to. Case
(1) presents the question, both under the N.I.L. and the Code, as to whether
the plaintiff is or is not a holder in due course. As far as the nature of
the claim of plaintiff is concerned, results under the Code should be the
same as under the N.I.L. for it is law and equity outside the statute which
determines validity of the claim. But the facts which constitute one a holder
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in due course under the N.I.L. are not quite the same as are the facts which
constitute one a holder in due course under the Code. The present writer
has discussed this question at some length elsewhere.2"
Case (2) is considered in the section immediately following this section
of this article under the heading: Right of a Party to Set Up in Defense a
Claim of a Third Party.
Case (3), the case of double equities, the present writer has discussed
elsewhere. 29
Case (4) is the overdue paper problem. It has been discussed brilliantly
by Professor Chafee.8 The present writer attempted to summarize Professor
Chafee's article elsewhere."' A further attempted condensation is as follows:
The bona fide purchaser of an overdue instrument, under the English
rule, takes subject to all equities of ownership as well as equities of defense.
The American cases, generally, protect the bona fide purchaser of an
overdue instrument if the circumstances are such that the owner of the equity
may be deemed estopped by his voluntary transfer to the wrongdoer.
Some American cases confine protection of the bona fide purchaser of
an overdue instrument to those claims of ownership of claimants who were
not in the chain of title. That is latent equities alone are shut out. Substantially an equal number of cases deny such protection, thus reflecting the
English rule.
A few cases protect the bona fide purchaser after maturity from equities
of ownership which are not discoverable by inquiry from the maker or
drawee.
With but few exceptions the cases deny protection to a bona fide purchaser after maturity from a thief or finder of a bearer instrument, whether
the instrument was lost or stolen before or after maturity.
Chafee's investigation into the problem leads him to the conclusion that

a bona fide purchaser of overdue paper should take free from all equities

of ownership including those of an owner who lost a bearer instrument or
from whose possession such an instrument was stolen.

Neither under the N.I.L. nor under the Code would an innocent purchaser after maturity be protected on the ground that he is a holder in due
course. The result is that the Overdue Paper Problem would remain the
same under the Code as it is under the N.I.L. and was at common law, but
subject to the following observation. It might be that some results would
be changed by the Code resulting from its rejection of the rule of See. 52(2)
of the N.I.L. which requires, for due course holding, that the instrument be
purchased "before it is overdue," and its substitution, in See. 302 of the
rule: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (c)
Britton, supra note 27.
s Britton, supra note 27 at 436-38.
"Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. REv. 1104 (1918).
" Ba~rroN, BILLS &NOTES, §§ 73847.
28
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without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.""2

Sec. 12. Right of a Partyto Set Up in Defense a Claim of a Third
Party
The problem here raised concerns the right of a party who when sued
on the instrument, has no defense of his own, to set up in defense an outstanding legal or equitable title, or other right of restitution, owned by a
third party who is not a party to the litigation.
At common law an obligor on a negotiable instrument could successfully
defend an action against himself if the plaintiff could not prove the genuineness of all indorsements necessary to his title, assuming that the issue of
genuineness had been properly tended by the pleadings.3 " The rule remains
the same under the N.I.L.34
At common law, by the weight of authority, a party to a bill or note
when sued thereon was not allowed to set up in defense an outstanding equity
of ownership or comparable right of restitution in a third party not a party
to the action, 5 nor could such party defeat an action against himself by
showing that the plaintiff acquired title in an illegal transaction.36
Under the N.I.L. the law with respect to the jus tertii is fragmentary
and chaotic in that it springs from statutory provisions involving inconsistent
policies. To survey the various situations: (1) there is no doubt but that
under Sec. 23-the forgery section-a defendant may successfully set up
an outstanding legal title in a party whose necessary indorsement had been
forged.
(2) Under Sec. 22," a party to a bill or note, when sued thereon,
cannot set up in defense the right of disaffirmance of an infant or corporate
indorser.
.Britton, supra note 27 at 421-30.

a Lancaster v. Baltzell, 7 Gill &J. (Md.) 468 (1836).
24

Gilbert v. Miller, 68 Cal.App. 40, 228 Pac. 662 (1924) ; Hirsh v. Ollendorf, 117 N.J.L. 404,
189 Atl. 82 (1937) ; Van Sycle v. Egg Harbor Coal & Lbr. Co., 109 N.J.L. 604, 162 Ad. 627 (1932) ;
Hillman v. Corrett, 137 Va. 200, 119 S.E. 74 (1923).

" Caldwell v. Lawrence, 84 IMI.161 (1876) ; Pronty v. Roberts, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 19 (1850) ;
Brown v. Penfield, 36 N.Y. 473 (1867) ; Kinney v. Kruse, 28 Wis. 183 (1871). Contra: Parsons v.
Utica Cement Mfg. Co., 82 Conn. 333, 73 At. 785 (1909); Merchants' Exchange Nat. Bank v.

New Brunswick Savings Inst., 33 N.J.L. 170 (1868) ; Solomons v. Bank of England, 13 East 136,
104 Eng. Rep. 319 (1791).
"Tindal v. Childress, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 250 (1832) ; Roberts v. Taylor, 7 Post. (Ala.) 251
(1838); Rumping v. Arkansas Nat. Bank, 121 Ark. 202, 180 S.W. 749 (1915) ; Higginbotham v.

McGreardy, 183 Mo. 96, 81 S.W. 883 (1904). Many other cases in accord and contra are collected
in BiunroN, BmLns &NOTES, § 160 at 766.
" N.I.L. § 22: The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation or an infant

passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or infant
may incur no liability thereon.
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(3) Under Sees. 60, 61 and 62,8 the maker, drawer and indorser of
an instrument when sued thereon cannot set up in defense the incapacity
of the payee existing at the time of issuance.
(4) Other cases of incapacity are not provided for, in the N.I.L., thus
giving rise to a possible opposing rule but also suggesting that the rule of
Sees. 22, 60, 61 and 62 is illustrative of the broader principle that a party
to a bill or note cannot set up a right of restitution of any indorser whose
indorsement is deemed voidable because of incapacity and that the same
may be so extended by analogy.
(5) Under Sec. 39 of the N.I.L. no party to a bill or note above a
conditional indorser may successfully defend the action brought by a holder
by showing the non-fulfillment of the condition.3 9
Thus far all of the sections of the N.I.L., above referred to, emerge
from the same legal policy, i.e., the policy of denying the defendant the
right to set up the jus tertii.
(6) What does the N.I.L. have to say about the widely varied and more
numerous situations where the plaintiff, not a holder in due course, has a
title, acquired by fraud, illegality, etc., which may be subject to a right of
restitution in a third party, not a party to the action? The N.I.L. does not
come to grips with this problem. It is dealt with in a sort of "back-handed"
way by implications from N.I.L. Sees. 51, 88, 119 and the last sentence
of Sec. 59. The reasoning is somewhat long and involved and has been set
forth by the present writer elsewhere,40 but suffice it to say that the net effect
of these implications is to suggest a rule just the opposite of the specific
rules contained in the several sections above commented on.
With respect to the broad issue under the N.I.L., in cases where the
plaintiff acquired the instrument by fraud or in breach of trust or in an
illegal transaction, the cases continued, as at common law, to be in conflict
and without much consideration of the sections of the N.I.L. which had a
bearing on the problem. 1
The important consideration now is to note what the Code proposes
to do with the full sweep of the jus tertii problem.
" N.I.L. § 60: The maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay
it according to its tenor, and admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
N.I.L. §§ 61 and 62 use the same language with respect to drawers and acceptors.
"9N.I.L. § 39: Where an instrument is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may
disregard the condition, and make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the condition
has been fulfilled or not. But any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated, will
hold the same, or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the person indorsing conditionally.
40 BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36, § 159.
,1 The cases are collected in BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 761-70.
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N.I.L. See. 22 is reproduced by Code Sec. 207(1) (a) wherein it is
provided:
Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although the negotiation is made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers or any other
person without capacity.
The Code provision is superior because it is not confined to infant and
corporate incapacity but includes all other kinds of incapacity.
N.I.L. Sees. 60, 61 and 62, dealing with incapacity of the payee, are
reproduced by Code Sec. 413(3):
By making, drawing, or accepting the party admits as against all subsequent parties including the drawee the existence of the payee and his then
capacity to indorse.
N.I.L. Sec. 39, dealing with conditional indorsements, is reproduced
by Code Sec. 205, but with one beneficial exception, as to a part of the rule,
in favor of collecting and paying banks:
Code Sec. 205. Neither a conditional indorsement nor one purporting
to prohibit further transfer of the instrument prevents its further transfer
or negotiation, and the transferee may enforce payment in disregard of the
limitation; but the indorsee and any other subsequent transferee except a
collecting or payor bank takes the instrument or its proceeds subject to any
rights of the indorser.
What does the Code propose with respect to the right of a defendant
to set up the jus tertii when the plaintiff has acquired the instrument by
fraud, or in breach of trust or in an illegal transaction? Under the N.I.L.,
from Secs. 51, 88, 119, and the last sentence of Sec. 59, implications, some
strong and some weak, it seems that the right of restitution in a third party
may be set up.
The Code collides head on with this result and lays down the broad
rule that the outstanding jus tertii cannot be set up. This is a commendable
change. All of the Code's provisions on the various phases of the fus tertii
problem are consistent, i.e., it cannot be set up except where the outstanding
]us tertii is a legal title, one resulting from a forged indorsement of the
claimant's name. These desirable changes are accomplished by the sections
quoted below.
Code See. 207(1). Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument
although the negotiation is
(a) made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or any other
person without capacity; or
(b) obtained by fraud, duress or mistake of any kind; or
(c) part of an illegal transaction, or
(d) made in breach of duty.
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such negotiation is subject to rescission, the declaration of a constructive trust or any
other remedy permitted by law.
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Sec. 207(1) (a) retains the principle of N.I.L. Sec. 22 and desirably
extends it to all other cases of incapacity.
Sec. 207(1) (b) (c) and (d) desirably reverse the principle of N.I.L.
Sec. 88 and the last sentence of Sec. 59.
The Code also proposes the same results, as those required by Code
Sec. 207, through other sections.
Code Sec. 306. Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any
person takes the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on
a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want of consideration, non-performance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose;
and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument acquired it by theft. The claim of any third person to the
instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any party
liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action
for such party.
It is Sec. 306(d) that deals with the ]us tertii problem. To take the
minor one first. Under the first sentence a defendant, having no defense
of his own, may successfully defend if the plaintiff stole the instrument
or acquired it, with knowledge, from one who did steal it. This seems to
have been the common law rule.4 2 The same result probably would be
reached under the N.I.L.45
The second sentence of Code Sec. 306(d) adopts the sweeping principle
that the defendant who has no defense cannot set up the right of restitution
in a third party. Note that the case of a plaintiff who is a finder, or who
with knowledge acquired the instrument from a finder, cannot be met by
the defense that he was such, thus producing a result different, and it is
believed, justifiably so, than in the theft case.
And finally, the Code expressly repudiates the rule of N.I.L. Secs. 88
and 119 that payment, in order for it to operate as a discharge must have
been made in due course. N.I.L. Sec. 88 reads:
Payment is made in due course when it is made at or after maturity
of the instrument to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that
his title is defective.
The proposal to repudiate the present rule that a payment, to operate
as a discharge, must be made without knowledge of an outstanding right
of restitution is accomplished by Code Sec. 603 which reads:
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment
"Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N.Y. 486 (1878); Hinckley v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 129 Mass. 52,
37 Am.Rep. 297 (1880).
" The problem is discussed in BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 762-66.
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or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with knowledge of a
claim of another person to the instrument unless prior to such payment or
satisfaction the person making the claim either supplies indemnity deemed
adequate by the party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which
the adverse claimant and the holder are parties.
This reversal of the principle of N.I.L. Sec. 88 is eminently wise.

It seems odd to leave the amount of the indemnity up to the decision
of an interested party, as the Code does, instead of the court.

See. 13. FictitiousPayees
N.I.L. Sec. 9(3). The instrument is
payable to bearer when it is payable to
the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable.

Code Sec. 405(1). An indorsement by
any person in the name of a named payee
is effective if .. . (b) a person signing
as or on behalf of a drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or (c) an agent or employee of the
drawer has supplied him with the name of
the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest.

The present writer, elsewhere, has summarized the result of the cases
under N.I.L. Sec. 9(3) as follows:
Case 1. "If an instrument is made payable to the order of a designated
payee whether such payee is a real person or a non-existing person and the
person who made the instrument so payable, whether such person was the
drawer himself, or an agent of the drawer, or a forger of the drawer's name,
and such person intends that the designated payee shall have no interest
in the instrument and further intends that the person to whom he, in fact,
issues the instrument shall have the interest therein, such instrument is
treated just as if it were payable to bearer on its face."
Case 2. "Conversely, if an instrument is made payable to the order of
a designated payee whether such payee is a real person or a non-existing
person, and the person who made the instrument so payable, whether such
person was the drawer himself, or an agent of the drawer or a forger of the
drawer's name, and whether induced by fraud or mistake to do so and such
person intends that the designated payee shall have the interest in the instrument and that it shall be issued to such payee, and such person delivers such
instrument to the fraudulent agent of the drawer or to a fraudulently procuring third party, and the party thus in possession of the instrument indorses
the payee's name, such indorsement operates as a forgery, as an instrument
so drawn is not deemed
payable to bearer under N.I.L. Sec. 9(3) but is
44
payable to order."

The typical situation in Case 1 arises where an agent has authority to
sign his principal's name as the drawer of checks, and so draws a check,
oftentimes a series of checks, intending never to send such checks to the
" BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 696.
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payees but intending to indorse the payee's name himself and obtain the
proceeds, from some bank or other third party other than the drawee bank,
and does so, the check being ultimately paid by the drawee bank. As between
the drawer, depositor, and the drawee bank, who loses? Under N.I.L. Sec.
9(3) the bank's debit of the check to the depositor's account is proper
because the check is declared by the section to be payable to bearer. The
payee's indorsement is not forged.
The typical situation in Case 2 arises with respect to a fraudulent
employee who does not have authority to sign his employer's name as the
drawer of checks but usually has the duty of preparing checks from invoices
received and payrolls and of obtaining the signature of the drawer from
that agent or officer of the employer who does have authority to sign the
employer's name. To accomplish this fraud, obviously the fraudulent agent
must have false invoices or payroll sheets to present to the authorized agent
in order to obtain the drawer's signature. The intent of the fraudulent agent
is the same in both cases-he intends to embezzle the proceeds. The two cases
differ in this: in Case 1 the fraudulent agent is "the party making it so
payable." Therefore, the resulting check is payable to bearer with the
consequence that the loss will ultimately be thrown upon the depositor.
In Case 2 the fraudulent party is not "the party making it so payable." The
signing officer, who was fraudulently induced to sign the check is "the party
making it so payable," therefore the resulting check is not payable to
bearer but is payable to order with the consequence that the loss will fall,
in the first instance upon the drawee bank and ultimately upon the party
who dealt with the fraudulent agent. The fraudulent agent is, of course,
ultimately liable.
A number of years ago the American Bankers' Association recommended to the several states that the fictitious payee section of the N.I.L.
Sec. 9(3), be so amended that most of the cases in Case 2 would, thereafter,
be controlled by the rule in cases that fall in Case 1, i.e., that the losses
from the forged indorsement cases be lifted from both the drawee and collecting banks and be thrown upon the depositor. The specific amendment to
Sec. 9(3) took the form of the recommendation that there be added to
Sec. 9(3) the following clause:
"... or known to his employee or other agent who supplies the name
of such payee,"
so that Sec. 9(3), if amended would read:
"The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of
a fictitious or non-existent person, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable or known to his employee or other agent who supplies
the name of such payee."
This amendment has been made in several states. Hence in these states
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the number of fictitious payee situations is greatly expanded. The Code,
Sec. 405, incorporates this amendment, with slightly changed phraseology.
The Code provision reads:
"An indorsement by any person in the name of a payee is effective if...
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the payee to have
no interest in the instrument, or (c) an agent or employee of the drawer has
supplied him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest."
What changes in the present law concerning fictitious payees are
proposed in Sec. 405 of the Code? Basically, nothing of material consequence. Some changes in phaseology have been made and these are important and should serve useful purposes in jurisdictions where the courts have
not yet worked out a rationale of fictitious and non-fictitious payee problems,
for the reason that the Code eliminates some confusing language incorporated
in N.IL. Sec. 9(3).
Both in the common law cases and in N.I.L. See. 9(3) the words
"fictitious or non-existing person" never function except to confuse any
person who had but slight acquaintance with the cases. A person "fictitious"
in fact, or "non-existing person" could be real in the sense that the indorsement of no other person would pass title. Conversely, a person, real in fact,
could be fictitious under the section because in both situations no legal
consequences flowed from factual fictitiousness or factual non-existence or
from factual non-fictitiousness or actual existence but the legal consequences
flowed solely from the intention of the "person making it (the instrument)
so payable." The Code's proposal to throw out these confusing expressions
is wise.
The Code's further proposal not to declare so-called fictitious paper
to be payable to bearer but to provide that the indorsement of the payee's
name, in a case controlled by the section, shall operate as genuine for the
purpose of passing title, is also wise. It has always been confusing for the
statute to say that an instrument which factually is payable to order shall
be treated just as if it were payable to bearer on its face. It was never
necessary for the law to so provide, for all that was ever desired was for
the indorsement to operate to pass title. Accordingly, the Code provides:
"An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective,...."
As a matter of fact fictitious paper is always indorsed by the fraudulent
party for otherwise he would not be able to negotiate it. The Code gives
such effect to his signature and also to that of "any person," thus giving
effect to an indorsement by the fraudulent agent's confederate as well as to
that of the fraudulent agent himself.
The Code's provision that "an indorsement by any person in the name
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of the named payee is effective," is defective in this: that the section does not
state "effective" for what purpose. It should be effective for the purpose
of passing title only and not effective for the purpose of imposing liability
upon the person whose indorsement was so made. No court would ever
impose such liability but the section might well have expressly provided for
non-liability, particularly so since the draftsmen were careful to provide
that "Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of
the person so indorsing." This sentence might well have continued by adding
the clause: "or the civil liability of the person whose indorsement was so
signed."
Case 3. The cases of double signatures, where one signer falls within
the meaning of the first paragraph above quoted, and where the other signer
falls within the meaning
45 of the second paragraph above quoted, may be
summarized as follows:
"If an instrument is made payable to the order of a designated payee,

whether such payee is a real person or a non-existing person, and two or
more persons cooperate in signing the drawer's name thereto, one or more
of which signers intend that the designated payee shall have no interest in
the instrument and the same parties further intend that the person to whom
he or they in fact issue the instrument shall have the interest therein, and
the remaining co-signers intend that the designated payer shall have the
interest in the instrument and that it shall be issued to such payee, the cases
are in conflict on the question as to which of the two groups of signers
constitute 'the person making it (the instrument) so payable'."
What about Case 3, the double signature case under Sec. 405 of the
Code? Neither the N.I.L. nor the Code takes cognizance of this type of case.
It remains quite serious under the N.I.L. However, under N.I.L. Sec. 9(3),
as amended, virtually the entire problem of double signatures disappears
because the intent is determined by that of the fraudulent agent, not only
as regards his own signature but as regards the signature of the co-agent
who is defrauded into signing, hence the failure to deal with the double
signature situation is essentially inconsequential.
If one approves the broad policy contained in the amendment to Sec.
9(3) of the N.I.L.-and the common law cases were already moving in that
direction -a policy which is contained in See. 405 of the Code, this section
is an improvement over N.I.L. See. 9(3).
"' BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 711. Many of the cases are reviewed in Portland Postal
Employees' Credit Union v. United States National Bank of Portland, 171 Ore. 40, 135 P.2d 467
(1943).
46 There are cases where an employee fraudulently procures the signature of his employer as
drawer, by the use of forged invoices and the like, and indorses the payee's name-a true forged
indorsement case-where the courts, in many cases, have allowed the drawee to debit the drawer's
account under the forged indorsement on the ground that the employer has been negligent in
setting up his administrative machinery, thus making it easier for a fraudulent employee to forge
indorsements on the checks of his employer intended for remittance to creditors. The cases are
collected in BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 663-78.
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Sec. 405 of the Code is defective in not having expressly provided for
fictitious indorsees. Sec. 9(3) of the N.I.L. also omitted reference to
fictitious indorsees, and while such a case may be rare it has arisen and
should have been provided for."
Sec. 14. Effect of Issuance of an Instrument to a Payee as a Result
of the Payee's Fraudor the Issuer's Mistake
Case 1. Where a known person, by fraud, induces another to issue
his note or check to such known payee, obviously the payee gets a title.
The payee acquires a voidable title or, what the N.I.L. calls, a "defective
title." The indorsement by the payee of his own name, obviously is not
a forgery. An innocent purchaser would take title free from the maker's
or drawer's defense. This situation is dealt with by the N.I.L. and the Code
with like results.
Case 2. Where a person, by fraudulent impersonation of another,
induces the maker or drawer to issue an instrument to the imposter under
the fraudulently assumed name, does the imposter acquire title to the instrument or only possession? Stated otherwise, does the imposter's indorsement
of the instrument in the fraudulently assumed name constitute a forgery
or does the imposter acquire a voidable title just as he does in Case 1?
The result of the cases can be stated as follows:
"Where a person, by fraudulent impersonation of another in person
induces the maker of a note or the drawer of a check to draw the instrument
payable to the order of the person impersonated and to issue the same to
the imposter, the imposter acquires title thereto. His indorsement in the
name of the designated payee is not a forgery.
"Where the imposter conducts fraudulent negotiations by impersonation
by mail, telegraph or telephone, by the weight of authority the imposter
similarly gets title to the instrument and his indorsement of the payee's
name is not a forgery." 48
"An instrument may be issued by the maker or drawer to a person other
than the designated payee under varied circumstances where such party in
possession does not get title thereto, as for example when it is issued to one
who fraudulently represents himself to be an agent of the payee." 49
The N.I.L. contains no specific provision dealing with the impersonation
cases, other than Sec. 23, the section which deals generally with the subject
of forgery.
Sec. 405 of the Code proposes to deal expressly with the impersonation
cases. It provides:
An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective
" Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N.E.2d 465 (1954) is such a case.
" For a, case dealing with misrepresentation by telephone, see Russell v. Second Nat. Bank of
Paterson, 136 NJ.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (1947).

" The cases are collected in BarrroN, op. cit. supra note 36 at 715-28.
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if (a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name
of the payee.

The proposal would codify the impersonation cases where there is faceto-face dealing by the imposter with his victim, and would also codify the
majority of the cases where the imposter works through the mails, by telegraph or telephone but would change the result of the minority rule wherein

it is held that in such cases the imposter acquires possession only, his indorsement of the payee's name being treated as a forgery.
The majority rule seems preferable. The Code's proposal is wise.
Suppose the drawer of an order check by mistake mails it to a person
of the same name as that of the intended payee and the person who receives
the check indorses the payee's name. Is such indorsement a forgery or does
the indorsee acquire a "defective title"? This case is analogous to the
imposter cases.
The result of the cases can be stated in the following language.
"Where an order instrument gets into the possession of a person of the
same name as that of the intended payee or special indorsee, without negligence of the maker, drawer or special indorser, i.e., through the independent
act of a third party, the indorsement of the name of such payee or special
indorsee by the party in possession is a forgery.
"Where an instrument gets into the possession of a person of the same
name as that of the intended payee or special indorsee through the negligent
act of the maker, drawer, remitter or indorser, the cases are in conflict on
the question whether the indorsement of the party in possession is or is not
a forgery." 50
The N.I.L. contains no provision dealing with this problem, other

than Sec. 23-the forgery section. Nor does the Code deal with this specific
problem. It should have done so.
Sec. 15. The Doctrine of Price v. Neal
In the oceans, with their infinite motions, there are some so important
that they have been surveyed and are known by names conferred upon them.
Faults, from which earthquakes rise and molten lava shoots out its devastating
streams are also known by proper names. Similarly, in the moving law and
in the fissures of the at times static legal crust, there is some law that is
known by the name of the case which started the movement. Such a case
is Price v. Neal.5
It seems that one Lee, short on funds and long on the belief that he
could circumvent the criminal law, forged the name of one Sutton to two
"0The cases are collected in BRuTTON, op. cit. supra note 36 at 725-28.
" 3 Burr. 1354, 96 Eng. Rep. 221 (1762).
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bills of exchange, each for £40 and each payable to the order of one Ruding,
directed to one John Price, as drawee. Each of these bills came into the
hands of one Edward Neal for value, one of which had been accepted by
the drawee and the other not. The drawee paid both the accepted bill and
the non-accepted bill to Neal. The purported drawer, Sutton, on learning
of this attempted raid upon his funds, and, in cooperation with the drawee,
Price, called on Scotland Yard, or some equivalent agent, to track down the
forger. He was soon caught and, Lord Mansfield tells us, was hanged,. even
before the father of Commercial Law handed down his famous decision
which informed Mr. Price that he could hot get back the £80 which he had
theretofore paid Mr. Neal, in the belief that the drawer's purported signature
was genuine.
Mr. Yates, counsel for the nervous Neal, who feared for his £80,
aroused as much, perhaps, as was Erskine at another time, but with less law
to back him up but apparently the persuasive oratory released by Counsel
Yates in Old Guild Hall so completely won over Lord Mansfield to the view
that Mr. Neal could keep the money, that the great judge stopped Barrister
Yates before he had reached his peroration and, from the Bench, uttered
his famous dictum: "This is one of those cases that could never be made
plainer by argument," and then, bringing down his gavel with a ringing
rap on the bench, the Chief Justice terminated the famous case with the
words: "Postea to the defendants." From then on Price v. Neal has adorned
or marred, as the case may be, some of the pages of legal history.
Lord Mansfield's silencer that the case could never be made plainer by
argument remains true in 1955, though perhaps in a different sense than
that which accompanied its utterance. Many have tried to make it plainer
by searching for reasons which would harmonize Price v. Neal with the rules
in analogous situations: Ames," Keaner,53 Wigmore,5" Woodward55 and
others have tried it, but for the most part, their discoveries have been
regarded as so academically esoteric that very little use has been made of
them by the courts.
The rule is here. It was codified in Sec. 62 of the N.J.L., or at least a
good portion of it was and the rest has been added by judicial accretion.
The rule of the case, and of Sec. 62, that money paid out by an innocent
drawee on an instrument bearing the forged signature of the drawer cannot
be recovered from an innocent purchaser is commonly regarded as an
exception to the rule that money paid out on mutual mistake of material fact,
52

Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HA.v. L. REv. 297 (1890).

"KEENER, QUAsi-CoNTRACTs 26 (1893).
" Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts,25 Am. L. REv. 696.
G'WOODwAMD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913).
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or, as otherwise phrased, in misreliance upon a supposed duty, is nonrecoverable.
How far has, or may, such exceptional rule be carried by analogy?
Where should it meet an effective stop sign? To survey actualities and

possibilities:
(1) Forged drawer's signature-Pricev. Neal, proper;
(2) Forged drawer's signature, but the instrument being accepted by
the drawee, either prior to the holder's acquisition of title, or subsequent
thereto;
(3) Genuine signature of the drawer, but the instrument being nondebitable to his account, because his signature was void for want of capacity,
or because of statutory illegality;
(4) Genuine signature of the drawer but the instrument being nondebitable to his account because it was incomplete when stolen from the
drawer or lost by him and its escape was deemed not the result of the
drawer's negligence;
(5) Genuine signature of the drawer but the instrument being nondebitable to his account because it was acquired from the drawer under
circumstances which gives rise to a real defense-the fraud in the execution
case;
(6) Genuine signature of the drawer the instrument being non-debitable
to his account because it was paid in disregard of a valid stop payment
order;
(7) Genuine signature of the drawer, accompanied by a forged document of title, properly debitable to the account of the drawer;
(8) Genuine signature of the drawer, the instrument being subsequently
altered by non-apparent erasures and substitutions, and being non-debitable,
as altered, to his account;
(9) Genuine signature of the drawer, the instrument being subsequently
altered by the non-apparent insertion of words and figures in blank spaces
in a completed instrument negligently left by the drawer, and probably,
properly debitable to his account;
(10) Genuine signature of the drawer, the instrument bearing the
forged indorsement of the payee's or special indorsee's name and thus being
non-debitable to the drawer's account;
(11) Genuine signature of the drawer of an overdraft, properly debitable to his account;
(12) Forged signature of the maker on a promissory note or bond paid
by the maker or issuer;
(13) Another series could be conceived of wherein various combinations of two or more of the above generalized situations are present in the
same case.
Undoubtedly, other cases could be thought of but enough is pointed
out in the above series to make evident the sweeping potentialities for
extending or for refusing to extend the Price v. Neal analogy.
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Only some of these cases, so far as known, have been presented to
common law courts and only some of them to courts which had to pass upon
the issues under the fragmentary treatment of the problem provided by
N.I.L. See. 62. But all of these situations, and perhaps more, are well within
the bounds of probable presentation and some of them, lying on the periphery
of the field, have been presented.
It is not proposed here to discuss existing cases under any of the above
enumerated classes of cases nor to speculate on the possible or probable
results in those cases, which, so far as known, have not arisen. Something
along these lines has been done by the present writer elsewhere. 5" What is
proposed is to compare the proposals of the Code in these areas with N.I.L.
Sec. 62.
N.I.L. Sec. 62. The acceptor by acceptCode Sec. 418. Except for recovery of
ing the instrument engages that he will bank payments as provided in the Article
pay it according to the tenor of his accept- on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article
ance; and admits4) and except for liability for breach of
1. The existence of the drawer, the
genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and
2. The existence of the payee and his
then capacity to indorse.

warranty on presentment under the preceding sections, payment or acceptance
of any instrument is final in favor of a
holder in due course.
Code Sec. 417(1). Unless otherwise
agreed any person who obtains payment
or acceptance and any prior transferor
warrants to a party who pays or accepts
in good faith
(a) that he has good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment
or acceptance on behalf of one who has
the title; and
(b) that he has no knowledge or (sic)
any effective direction to stop payment;
and
(c) that the instrument has not been
materially altered, and that he has no
knowledge that the signature of the maker
or drawer is unauthorized, except that
such warranties are not given by a holder
in due course who has taken a draft drawn
on or accepted by a bank after such alteration or signature or by a holder in due
course of a note. This exception applies
even though a draft has been accepted
"payable as originally drawn" or in
equivalent terms.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed any party

who transfers an instrument for consid8

BaRrTON,

BiuTS &NoTEs §§ 13541.
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eration warrants to his transferee and if
the transfer is by indorsement to any sub-

sequent holder who takes the instrument
in good faith that
(a) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(b) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(c) the transfer is rightful; and
(d) no defense of any party is good
against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the
drawer of an unaccepted instrument.
(3) By transferring "without recourse"
the transferor limits the obligation stated
in subsection (2) (d) to a warranty that
he has no knowledge of such defense.
(4) A selling agent or broker who does
not disclose the fact that he is acting only
as such gives the warranties provided in
this section, but if he makes such disclosure warrants only his good faith and
authority.

Directing attention to the first clause of Code Sec. 418, excepting from
the section the provisions contained in Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collec-

tions-which have to do with the recovery of bank payments: this exclusion,
from Sec. 418, has reference to sections in Article 4 which have to do with

final and provisional payments. They do not affect the Price v. Neal problem
or its corollaries.
The second "except" clause, having to do with breach of warranty,
will be discussed below.
What does Sec. 418 do that is or is not done by N.I.L. Sec. 62? The
Price v. Neal situations, enumerated above, will be taken up in the order
there set forth.
(1) N.I.L. Sec. 62, by declaring that the acceptor admits the genuineness of the drawer's signature, deprives the acceptor of the defense that the
drawer's signature was forged as against a good faith purchaser. Decisions
have extended this result to payors of accepted and unaccepted bills such
that the drawee cannot recover the money so paid from a good faith purchaser
of the bill. This is Price v. Neal proper.
Sec. 418 of the Code accomplishes the same result by declaring that
"payments or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in
due course." [The present writer proposes to comment upon what, to him,
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seems an improper use of the term "holder in due course," but since this
term carries through the series, comment will be made after the various
situations have been considered.]
(2) The case of the accepted forged check is commented under (1)
above. Results the same under N.I.L. Sec. 62 and the Code Sec. 418.
(3) Instrument void for want of capacity in the drawer or void because
of illegality. Under N.I.L. Sec. 62 the acceptor admits the capacity of the
drawer. Therefore the admission should have the same effect as the
acceptor's admission of the genuineness of the drawer's signature. Courts
likely would extend this to drawees who paid unaccepted bills. Same result
under Sec. 418 of the Code because such an acceptance or payment is
"final."
With respect to the illegal instrument the writer knows of no case.
Result is uncertain under the N.I.L. Under the Code, no recovery by drawee
because the payment is expressed to be "final."
(4) With respect to the case of the incomplete instrument which got
into circulation without negligence of the drawer, is filled up, and, under
assumed circumstances, where the drawee could not lawfully debit the
drawer's account, there are no known cases of actions by drawees against
the party so paid. Result under the N.I.L. is uncertain. Under the Code
acceptor is bound and drawee cannot recover because "payment or acceptance
of any instrument is final. . ....
(5) Also with respect to the fraud in the execution case where a real
defense exists, there are no known cases. Result under the N.I.L. uncertain.
Under the Code the drawee loses because his payment or acceptance "is
final."
(6) Payment by drawer's mistake after a valid stop-payment order.
Cases in conflict under the N.I.L. Under the Code, no recovery by drawee
unless the party receiving payment had knowledge of the stop order. This
result comes from Code Sec. 417(h) which provides for a warranty by
the person receiving payment to the drawee "that he has no knowledge or
(sic) any effective stop payment order."
(7) Genuine instrument accompanied by a forged document of title.
No recovery under N.I.L." No recovery under the Code for such payment
"is final."
(8) At common law the acceptor of an altered bill could successfully
set up the defense of material alteration. Also the payor of an accepted
altered bill or of an unaccepted altered bill could recover from the party
to whom payment was made. Under the N.I.L. it has been held, in two
"' Springs v. Hanover Nat. Bank of City of New York, 209 N.Y. 224, 103 N.E. 156 (1913).
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widely known cases, that a bank which certified a check, altered as to the
payee's name, was bound thereby.5" This result was reached under that
portion of N.I.L. Sec. 62 which provides: "The acceptor by accepting this
instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance," the courts interpreting the phrase "tenor of his acceptance" as meaning
the tenor of the bill at the time of acceptance. This decision extends the
responsibilities of drawees beyond the boundaries fixed at common law.
Presumably, but not beyond doubt, the common law rule would be reproduced under N.I.L. Sec. 62 with respect to payments of unaccepted bills and
checks.
Under Sec. 418 of the Code both acceptances and payments would be
final because the section so declares, but Sec. 418 here incorporates by
reference Sec. 417, which deals with, among other things, the problem of the
liability of paying and accepting drawees of altered bills.
Sec. 417(1) (c) of the Code provides:
Unless otherwise agreed any person who obtains payment or acceptance
and any prior transferor warrants to a party who pays or accepts in good
faith that the instrument has not been materially altered and that he has
no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unauthorized,
except that such warranties are not given by a holder in due course who has
taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank after such alteration or
signature or by a holder in due course of a note. The exception applies even
though a draft has been accepted "payable as originally drawn" or in
equivalent terms.
Consider first the case of the payment of an unaccepted or uncertified
altered draft (i.e., a bill of exchange) or check. The party who obtains the
payment, acceptance or certification "warrants to a party who pays or accepts
in good faith . . . that the instrument has not been materially altered."
This reproduces, basically, the common law rule because the drawee may
sue on the warranty and recover the money so paid, and an action upon
the acceptance or certification could be defeated by pleading the warranty.
The drawee would lose this cause of action if he paid or accepted in bad
faith, as for example, if the instrument bore evidence of apparent alterations.
This limitation is proper and would follow also from Sec. 304(1) (a) of
the Code.
Take next the case of the acceptance of a materially altered draft or
check or the payment thereof. In this case the party who obtained the
acceptance or certification or payment makes no warranty to the drawee
" Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931);
Nat. City Bank of Chicago v. Nat. Bank of Republic, 300 IM. 103, 132 N.E. 832 (1921). These cases
were quite generally disapproved: 19 CALIF. L. R-v. 210 (1931) ; 22 CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1933) ;
16 ILL. L. REv. 615 (1922) ; 29 MicH. L. RE V. 503 (1931) ; 6 MINN. L. REv. 405 (1922) ; 40 YALE
L. J. 1106 (1931). Approved: 35 HARV. L. REv. 749 (1922) ; 31 YALE L. J. 522 (1922).
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or acceptor for Sec. 417(c) reads: ".

.

. except that such warranties are

not given by a holder in due course who has taken a draft drawn on and
accepted by a bank after such alteration. . .

."

The drawee is liable on

his acceptance and if the drawee pays, the latter has no cause of action for
its recovery. Thus the Code has codified the decisions in the California and
Illinois cases. The question of policy involved is determined largely by
one's attitude toward Price v. Neal: i.e., the question whether it should be
restricted to its narrowest limits or expanded.
After the decisions in the California and Illinois cases, the common
law rule was restored if the drawee certified the check "payable as originally
drawn." The last sentence of Code Sec. 417(1) (c) renders such qualified
certification inoperative.
Sec. 417(1) (c) of the Code also imposes upon the party who obtains
the drawee's acceptance or the drawee's or maker's payment a warranty to
the drawee or maker "that he has no knowledge that the signature of the
maker or drawer is unauthorized." If, therefore, the holder of the instrument knew at the time he acquired. title that the maker's or drawer's signature
was forged or unauthorized, the maker or drawee could recover the money
paid out on the instrument. Price v. Neal never prevented the drawee from
recovering from the forger or from a person who acquired title from the
forger with knowledge of the forgery."
At common law and under N.I.L. Sec. 62, one who acquires title to a
forged instrument under circumstances deemed negligent-for example,
in taking the instrument from a stranger-in some cases would be liable to
the drawee, in others not. Sec. 417(1) (c) by implication provides that the
drawee may not recover from such party. This would seem to be the preferable result.
One observation concerning the holder in due course aspect of the
provision in Code Sec. 417(1) (c) declaring that "such warranty (i.e.,
against forgery and material alteration) is not given by a holder in due
course who has taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank after alteration or signature or by a holder in due course." This provision allows the
holder in due course to keep the money or to enforce the acceptance. The
point is this: the holder in due course status is fixed by reason of the facts
existing at the time of acquiring title but the legal position of such holder
in due course as regards the antecedent certifying bank, ought to be determined by the facts existing at the time of his suing on the certification or at
the time of payment by the certifying bank. If a holder in due course learns,
after he acquired title as a holder in due course, that the bank has certified
an altered or forged check he should not be allowed to enforce the certifica'g

The cases are collected in BIMON, op. cit. supra note 56 at 626-34.
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tion or to retain the payment. Suppose a person took a counterfeit bill, not
knowing it to be a counterfeit, and subsequently learns that he has a counterfeit bill. He then passes the bill off as genuine. Would it be contended that
he has not brought himself within the statute making it a crime knowingly
to pass counterfeit currency and would not the party, who innocently took
the counterfeit money, have a right to recover from the party who knowingly
passed it to him? The cases are analogous. The certifying bank should not
be compelled to pay the holder of the instrument known by him to have
been altered or forged prior to certification. This state of facts might be
rare but seems to the present writer bad policy to force the bank to pay
such a party. As Ames pointed out:" "A holder who acquired the bill
in good faith and with due care, but afterward discovered or suspected the
forgery, could not honestly collect an unaccepted bill, or procure an acceptance, and if he should collect it, would be bound to refund the money."
Let him go back on the party who negotiated the instrument to him. The use
of the term "holder in due course" in this connection is improper.
A further point, which to the present writer is disturbing. The whole
of Code Sec. 417 sets up the rules above referred to and then permits the
parties to throw all of them out and to set up any rule, or rules, which they
see fit to agree upon. The introductory phrase of Code Sec. 417(1) reads:
"Unless otherwise agreed. . . ." and so on. This is legal anarchy.
This abdication in favor of the parties' wishes is especially anomalous
for the reason that the draftsmen, after telling the parties that they can
ignore Sec. 417 and do what they please, strangely enough tell the partiesi.e., a certifying bank-that if it certifies the check "payable as originally
drawn," this agreement is inoperative. The section can't have it both ways.
The phrase "Unless otherwise agreed. . . ." should be stricken from Code
Sec. 417(1). This phrase is properly used in Sec. 417(2), dealing with
warranties to subsequent holders but not properly used in Code Sec. 417 (1).
One further point, and this has to do with the use of familiar terminology with an unfamiliar meaning. The term "warranty" in the law of
commercial paper has been used to describe certain obligations which run
from a holder or transferor to a transferee or indorsee, but never to describe
the legal relation between one who surrenders an instrument for payment.
There may be quasi-contractual obligations present but they have never
been called warranties. A holder may, of course, "warrant" something to
the drawee, and indeed the familiar indorsement accompanied by the statement: "prior indorsements guaranteed" is such a warranty. But for a statute
to use the term "warranty" to describe legal duties of holder to one who
"' Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1890), citing First Bank v. Ricker,
71 111. 439 (1874) ; Nat. Bank of N. America of Boston v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 (1871).
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"pays" the instrument, certainly historically, is a misnomer. A statute,
of course, may use a term in a new sense, but generally speaking, the closer
the meaning of statutory terms is made to coincide with the accepted meaning the greater clarity and certainty thereby will be promoted. A statute
could deal with "cattle," and, somewhere, tucked away in a list of definitions,
we might find that "for the purposes of this act the term 'cattle' shall include
'horses,' 'hogs' and 'sheep'" but such drafting policy should win no medals
for excellence.
(9) A completed instruument is altered by the insertion of words and
figures therein in blank spaces negligently left by the drawer. What are the
drawer's rights against the party to whom its payment of an uncertified
altered check or of a certified altered check is made? Code Sec. 406 permits
a good faith drawee to debit the account of the drawer and upon the instrument as altered. But suppose the drawer's account will not stand the debit.
May the drawee recover the money from the party to whom payment was
made? Results under the N.I.L. are not known. Presumably, the drawee
could recover from the party to whom payment was made except in the case
of a certification after alteration in which case the courts likely would follow
the rule in the California and Illinois cases.
Under Code Sec. 417 no distinction is drawn between alterations
effected by erasures and substitutions and those effected by the insertion
of words and figures in blank spaces negligently left by the drawer. Presumably, therefore, the drawee's rights and liabilities would be the same in
both cases.
(10) What are the drawee's rights to recover money paid out under
forged indorsements? Recovery was allowed at common law.6 1 No section
of the N.I.L. deals specifically with this problem other than the general
section on forgery, Sec. 23, which makes the forged indorsement inoperative.
Restitution is allowed on a quasi-contract theory.6 2
The same result would follow under the Code Sec. 417(1) (a) for a
"transferor warrants to a party who pays or accepts in good faith that he
has good title to the instrument. . . .." The difference would be that the
action of the drawee, under the Code, could be brought on a warranty theory.
His quasi-contract remedy, presumably, would still remain.
(11) May the drawee who has paid an overdraft recover the payment
from the party who received the same? At common law the drawee was not
allowed recovery. 3 This rule continued under the N.I.L.6 4 This case was
assimilated to the Price v. Neal rule. The result would be the same under
" Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287 (N.Y. 1841).
"The cases are collected in Barr'oN, op. cit. supra note 56, § 139 at 641-50.
6s Chambers v. Miller, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 128 (1862).
"First Nat. Bank of Portland v. Noble, 179 Ore. 26, 168 P.2d 354 (1946).
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Code Sec. 418 because "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final
in favor of a holder in due course."
(12) May a person whose signature was forged as the maker of a note
and who pays the same recover the money so paid? He could not do so at
common law.6 5 Presumably, the same result would be reached under N.I.L.
Sec. 62, although this section makes no reference to makers of notes but
the attitude of the courts to the effect that there is enough contained in
N.I.L. Sec. 62 to evidence the intention to codify the Price v. Neal rule and
all its corollaries would suggest this result. The same result should follow
under Sec. 418 of the Code for such payment is included among those
declared to be final and Code Sec. 417 imposes no warranty other than that
the party receiving payment is ignorant of the forgery.
Sec. 16. Some Problems Created by Forged Instruments
Take a typical case of a check drawn by M upon the D bank and
payable to the order of P. P's indorsement is forged. The check comes into
the hands of an innocent party, A. A deposits the check in the B bank.
B bank obtains payment, under the forged indorsement, from the drawee, D.
What causes of action are thus created?
The N.I.L. contains no section which deals specifically with any of the
possible causes of action. Solution is, therefore, found in common law
decisions, basically in the quasi-contract field.
The principal causes of action which can arise out of a payment by
a drawee under a forged indorsement and the law with respect thereto may
be summarized as follows.
(1) D, claiming that the indorsement of P was not forged may be
sued by its depositor M. Assuming forgery, the debit is wrongful. M can
require D to remove the wrongful debit. This is true under N.I.L. Sec. 23
and would be true under Code Sec. 404(1) for in each the forged signature
is declared to be "wholly inoperative."
(2) D, after the removal of the erroneous debit to M's account, may
sue A, and in some cases, the B bank and recover the money as money paid
out in mutual mistake of material fact.66
(3) P, the owner of the check, though out of possession, has not been
paid. What possible sources of recovery are presented to him? He has
three conceivable possibilities: (a) to get the money from the drawer, M;
(b) to get it from the collecting bank, B, or its depositor, A; or (c) to get
it from the drawee, D. How does the law treat each of these possible causes
of action? These cases will be taken up in order.
"' Mather v. Maidstone, 18 C.B. 273 (1856) ; Young v. Latham, 63 Ala. 519; Tyler v. Bailey,
71 Ill. 34 (1873) ; Allen v. Sharpe, 37 Ind. 67 (1871) ; Third Bank v. Allen, 59 Mo. 310 (1875).
"0The cases are collected in BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 56, § 139 at 641-49.
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(a) It is believed that P should be able to recover from M. P has a
right to get back his check. He can present it to D. If D refuses to pay
because it thinks the debit of M's account is rightful, P can take the necessary
proceedings on dishonor and should recover."7 If the issue of forgery is
still undetermined, D should be a party to P's suit against M. If P cannot
get his check back he should be able to sue upon it as on a lost instrument.
(b) P may try to recover from A or the collecting bank, B. P's attempt
to "cut across lots" and recover the money from the party who collected from
the drawee is obviously anomalous for we know the drawee, D, unquestionably has a right to recover from the party to whom it paid. Two people,
normally, cannot have concurrent rights to recover the same money. But,
it is conceivable, they might have the right in the alternative. That is, P
might be regarded as subrogated to D's cause of action if D were not suing.
In any event, it is well established that P can recover from the party who
collected from D."8 The Code contains a provision dealing with this problem,
to be discussed after reference to the entire series is made.
(c) P may try and recover from D. Here, again, an anomaly is
presented. When the drawee has paid out its own money, under the forged
indorsement, what has it done that could ground a cause of action against
it in favor of P? The drawer has done nothing more than if a depositor
deposited $100 in currency and then received credit and a bank teller
through inadvertence or design threw the deposited currency into the bank's
waste basket or furnace. Nonetheless many courts have allowed P to recover
from D. Theories of liability vary. Where recovery is allowed the drawee
is regarded as a converter or as a constructive acceptor. Other courts hold
there is no right in P to recover from D on any theory. 9 The cases are
sharply in conflict. The Code contains a provision on this problem to be
discussed after reference is made to the entire series.
The above cases exhaust P's possible causes of action in his desire to
collect the money called for by the check.
67 It is believed this states the law: Morris v. Bailey Steel Co. v. Bank of Pittsburgh, 277 Pa. 81,
120 Atl. 689 (1923), and cf. Southern Trust Co. v. American Bank of Commerce & Trust Co.,
148 Ark. 283, 229 S.W. 1026 (1921); Garthwaite v. Bank of Tulare, 134 Cal. 237, 66 Pac. 326

(1901) ; Hart v. Moore, 171 Miss. 838, 158 So. 490 (1935). Contra, McFadden v. Follrath, 114

Minn. 85, 130 N.W. 542 (1911).
68 The cases are collected in BRrrToN, op. cit. supra note 56, § 147 at 687-91. In Tibby Bros.

Glass Co. v. F. & M. Bank, 220 Pa. 1, 69 AtL 280 (1908), the Pennsylvania Court held, in an able
opinion, that P could not recover from the collecting party but in the interest of uniformity the

Pennsylvania Court expressly overruled the Tibby case in Lindsley v. First Nat. Bank of Phila-

delphia, 325 Pa. 393, 190 At. 876 (1937). The leading case supporting recovery is U. S. Portland
Cement Co. v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202 (1916).

"The cases are collected in BRrrToN, op. cit. supra note 56, § 146 at 681-87. One of the
leading cases supporting recovery is L. & N. R.R. Co. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat. Bank of Pensa.

cola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917). One of the leading cases denying recovery is Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263 (1926). A case in accord is Miller
v. Northern Bank, 239 Wis. 12, 300 N.W. 758 (1941).
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One other lawsuit could develop out of the forged indorsement problem.
The drawer might sue the party to whom the drawee paid. The cases,
though not numerous, are about equally divided as to whether recovery by
M can be had." The basic cause of action is that of the drawee against
the party to whom it paid. M cannot sue such party in the absence of an
assignment, either actual or by operation of law, from the drawee to the
drawer. In case of insolvency of the drawee, after its payment under a
forged indorsement, it would be obviously unjust to permit the drawer to
recover from the party paid by the drawee, for this money should go back
to the drawee so that all creditors could participate equally in its distribution.
The N.I.L. contains no provisions with respect to any of the problems
commented on in this section, other than Sec. 23, which deals generally
with the principal effects of forgery.
The Code, however, contains the following:
Sec. 419 (1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses to return
it on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on demand
either to pay or return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged instrument.
(2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure
of the drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any other
action under subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed to be the
face amount of the instrument.
(3) A representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who
has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument
or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in
conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds
remaining in his hands.

The Code Sec. 419(1) (c), therefore, rejects those cases which hold
that the drawee by paying under the forged indorsement is not liable, on
any theory, to the party whose indorsement was forged, and accepts those
cases which hold that the drawee thereby becomes a converter. It is believed
that this solution is unwise. Suppose the drawee, one minute after payment,
discovers the forged indorsement and that it immediately credited the
depositor's account and by special messenger sent the check to the holder.
There is no more reason for regarding the drawee's act as a conversion than
there would be for regarding the drawee as a converter if the holder lost
the check and the finder brought it to the drawee asking that the drawee
return the check to the owner. If this is plausible then the act of the drawee's
o That the drawer may not recover: Lavanier v. Cosmopolitan Bank & Trust Co., 36 Ohio
App. 285, 173 N.E. 216 (1929). Contra, Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Englewood,
306 Ill. 179, 137 N.E. 793 (1923).
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payment, in and of itself, cannot be tortious. What does the bank do thereafter that might make it a converter? About the only step it would take
would be to send the cancelled check to the drawer. What is wrong with this?
The holder still has a right to get possession of the check and either he
or the drawee could recover possession. It is, of course, usually held that
the innocent vendor of stolen personal property is liable as a converter
thereof but this rule is not extended to the innocent sale or handling of
commercial paper. 7 An innocent drawee should not vi et armis be forced
into that position. A different question would be presented if the drawee
refused to return or to obtain return of the check to the holder. The bank,
of course, might not want to do this for fear it would turn out that no indorsement had been forged. The bank would have to take its chances on its course
of action. But, it should seem reasonably evident that the drawee should
not be characterized as a tortious converter by reason of the sole act of
attempted payment under the forged indorsement but that is exactly what
the Code Sec. 419(1) (c) does. It is believed this solution is unwise.
The Code, apparently, codifies in a kind of back-handed way, the
prevailing view that the holder, whose indorsement was forged, may recover
from the party who collected from the drawee. Code See. 419(3) declares
that such person "is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner
beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands." Let us look
at this language. The section is saying that the collecting party "is not liable
in conversion or otherwise to the true owner. . . ." This would seem to be
an unqualified declaration of the non-liability of the collecting party to
the "true owner." But the section proceeds to say "beyond the amount of
any proceeds remaining in his hands." The implication from the closing
clause is that such a party would be liable in this amount. But the section
nowhere says that such party is liable. How can he be liable when the
section is saying affirmatively that he is "not liable in conversion or otherwise"? If the implication from the last clause is to be given any effect
as imposing liability, i.e., in cutting down the universality of declaration
of non-liability, then in what kind of action would he be liable? Would
he be liable in conversion or otherwise, and what guidepost is there to the
"otherwise" cause of action?
Again, who is the "true owner"? Is this a reference to the "true owner"
of the instrument or the "true owner" of the proceeds? They are not the
same. The drawee is the "true owner" of the proceeds and the holder is
the "true owner" of the check.
It is not apparent why the unusual phrasing-"A representative,
including a depositary or collecting bank"-is used in the section. The
problem concerns the liability of the person who got the money under the
" Gruntal v. Nat. Surety Co., 254 N.Y. 468,173 N.E. 682 (1930).
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forged indorsement from the drawee. This could be the forger, or a purchaser from the forger or someone who collects in behalf of the forger,
or other purchaser or an agent thereof. This idea could be more simply
and more clearly expressed than it is.
The present writer has expressed, elsewhere, his opinion of the undesirability of tacking on to the concept of "good faith" the shifting and unpredictable element here referred to as "the reasonable commercial standards
applicable to the business of such representative ... .
It is believed that the policy adopted by Sec. 419(3) is open to as
strong objections as is the policy of making a drawee liable in conversion
for paying an instrument under a forged indorsement and that the earlier
cases represented a sounder policy. This tangle ought to be unwound first
between the depositor and his bank, then the bank should get its money
from the party to whom it paid. The holder could go against the depositor
simultaneously. But this is not the way the cases developed. The issues, in
this series of forged indorsement cases, would appear more vividly than
they do if, in the same court, after the fact of forgery had been determined,
there was pending, simultaneously, an action by the drawee against the
party to whom it paid; an action by the holder, whose indorsement was
forged, against the drawee and also against the same defendant in the
drawee's suit; and also an action against the drawer of the check. And, for
good measure, the drawer might be suing the party who collected from the
drawee. Such a congerie of cases might generate some ideas concerning
election of remedies and assignments by operation of law.
Basic difficulties, which the courts have always had with actions by the
holder against the drawee or against the party who was paid by the drawee,
entirely aside, there is something on the practical side in support of the
holder's actions against the party who was paid by the drawee and that is
this: such a suit will settle all the liabilities around the quadrilateral. This
is true, only on the assumption that the fact of forgery has been determined
so as to be binding on all parties, or, if not so binding then that all parties
who are interested in the determination of the fact of forgery vel non are
parties to the litigation.
The inclusion of the provision, contained in Code Sec. 419(2), fixing
the measure of damages of the drawee, when sued for conversion, as the
"face amount of the instrument"-the accepted rule-is wise, assuming that
there has been no material alteration as to the amount prior to the drawee's
payment, or, if so, that there had been no certification subsequent to
alteration.
72 Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law With Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417,

431-32 (1954).
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Sec. 16. General Conclusions
There is much good drafting and policy decisions in the sections of the
Commercial Code which have been the subject of this article. The Code's
handling of the over-all problem of real and personal defenses is ably done
on both the policy and drafting levels. The Code's section on forgery is
better than that of the N.I.L. The incorporation of a section dealing with
fraud as a real defense seems preferable to omitting it as the N.I.L. did.
The Code's solution of the ]us tertii problem, both on the drafting and policy
side, is a welcome substitute for the fragmentary and contradictory treatment
accorded it by the N.I.L. The codification of the doctrine of Young v. Grote,
i.e., material alteration resulting from the negligent leaving of blank spaces
in a completed instrument, is wise, on the policy level, but the drafting of
the same on such broad language may well lead to undesirable extension
of the rule. The codification of the doctrine of Price v. Neal is far better
than Sec. 62 of the N.I.L. which sought the same object. The superiority
of the Code's provision lies largely in the fact that analogous situations
are expressly provided for rather than leaving them to conjecture as the
N.I.L. did. The analogous case of the position of a bank which certifies
an altered check, in the opinion of the writer, is not well done and might
well give rise to unexpected and undesired results. The Code's treatment
of the fictitious payee problem, consolidating with it the impersonation case
rule, is preferable to N.I.L. Sec. 9(3). The Code's section failed to provide
a rule for the delivery of an instrument to a person of the same name as
the payee, and also to provide for the fictitious indorsee case. These problems should have been covered. The Code's handling of the status of the
drawee which pays under a forged indorsement is open to serious question.
Despite the excellencies of this portion of Article 3 of the Code, there
are a number of sections that could profit from more study and from redrafting. No one expects perfection in drafting but if we are going to streamline
the highways of our commercial law we ought to do everything we can to
insure that it has adequate expansion joints, that the shoulders be hard,
that there will be no unexpected road hazards, that the curves will be wellbanked, that the bridges will stand the attack of the elements, and, that in
all respects, we will build the best highway possible. Reconstruction and
repair work done now will cost little compared to the cost after traffic begins
to move over the new road and the accidents occur.

